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ABSTRACT 
In a network attack investigation, the mountain of information collected 
from varying sources can be daunting.   Investigators face significant 
challenges in being able to correlate findings from these sources, given 
difficulties with time synchronization.   In addition, it is difficult to obtain 
summary or overview information for one set of data, much less the entire 
case.  This, in turn, makes it nearly impossible to accurately identify missing 
information.   
Identifying these information gaps is one problem, yet another is filling 
them in.  Investigators must rely on legal processes and requests to obtain the 
information they need.  However, it is extremely important they are aware of 
cases or events that cross jurisdictional boundaries.  Where tools exist to 
assist in evidence overview, they do not contain the necessary geographic 
information for investigators to quickly ascertain the location of those involved. 
In addition to these difficulties, investigators need to perform several types 
of analysis on the evidence that has been collected.  Several of these 
analyses cannot typically be performed on data from multiple log files, since 
they are based on timing data.  Furthermore, it is difficult to understand results 
from these analyses without visual representation, and there are no tools to 
bring them together in a single frame.   
This thesis details the design and implementation of an analysis and 
visualization extension for the Forensic Log Investigator, or FLI.  FLI is a web-
based analysis and visualization architecture built on advanced technologies 
and enterprise infrastructure.  This extension assists investigators by providing 
the ability to correlate evidence and analysis across traditional log file and 
analysis method boundaries, identify information gaps, and perform analysis in 
accordance with published evidence handling guidelines. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
There have been a number of changing factors that have led to the 
development and extension of the Forensic Log Investigator as a tool for 
practitioners of network forensics.  The evolution of the Internet has connected 
people and systems across nearly every categorical classification.  From the 
individual to the business, the public sector to the private sector, the virtuous 
to the vicious, use of computer networks has become part of the daily routine.  
This influx of Internet citizenry has brought with it an increase in cyber-societal 
issues similar to those in the physical world.   
One of the major draws influencing this change is the perceived value 
of networked targets.  In particular, as networks have transitioned from 
informational to operational, the value of data and systems accessible online 
has drastically increased.   
Progress can indeed be a double-edged sword; as the sophistication of 
networked applications has increased, so have the tools available to an 
attacker.  These attackers are primarily concerned with maintaining anonymity, 
and put to use a number of concealment tactics to thwart attribution attempts.  
While there is a philosophical debate on the issue of anonymity, our focus 
here is on accountability for law enforcement and internal review.  There are 
many tactics for concealment, such as using stepping stones, anonymizing 
networks, and distributed attacks.  Each utilizes different methods and 
principles to complicate attack attribution. 
In short, we hope that our work on this topic may someday help 
investigators to quickly understand a sequence of events, explore possible 
leads, identify information gaps, and present their findings.  We believe that 
the current state of available tools is inadequate to sift through the mountains 
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of evidence involved in technically complex cases, and the most effective tools 
are often unusable due to poor evidence handling routines.  The major design 
goals for this analysis and visualization extension are: 
• Provide ability for investigators to visually correlate evidence and 
analysis across multiple logs 
• Provide ability for investigators to visually correlate results from 
multiple types of analysis 
• Assist in identifying information gaps 
• Properly handle evidence when performing analysis 
1.2. Review of Literature 
1.2.1.  Visualization 
Webster’s defines visualization as “the act or process of interpreting in 
visual terms or of putting into visible form.” A visualization, then, is an application 
that uses images or symbols to convey information.  In the field of computer 
science, visualization is based in computer graphics and human computer 
interaction.  In this paper, we use the terminology defined by [10].  A visual 
encoding is a mapping of an information vector to a display element, such as 
analysis type to line color.  FLI Map visual encodings are defined in Section 
2.3.2.  Visual metaphors are a combination of visual encodings in a single 
display.  FLI Map visual metaphors are defined by analysis type – see Sections 
2.3.2.1 – 2.3.2.4.  Visualization, as a field of research, is generally broken down 
into two areas – information visualization and scientific visualization, based on 
the utilization of spatial data.  Scientific visualizations typically rely on spatial 
information included or implicit in the data itself.  Information visualizations, on 
the other hand, tend to use spatial layout in order to represent something about 
the data.  Finally, there is a subfield (typically considered part of information 
visualization) called security visualization.  This area focuses on the application 
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of visualization principles to information security systems. We found that our 
needs did not correspond directly to the contexts generally discussed in such 
research, which resulted in a need to draw on principles from all three areas. 
1.2.1.1. Scientific Visualization 
Scientific visualization was really the genesis of the field, as many of the 
first applications of computer graphics fell into this discipline. Such visualizations 
are essentially an extension of human perception, often providing us with ways to 
“see” things that are too small, too fast, or too dangerous, for us to observe on 
our own.  In other cases, they are simply data points that our body is incapable of 
sensing like infrared radiation or [10].  The data observed or produced inherently 
contains the spatial layout, such as a visualization application for ocean currents 
[8].   
1.2.1.2. Information Visualization 
Information visualization does not contain any inherent spatial data, but 
rather uses spatial layout as a component of the visual metaphor.  This spatial 
positioning has been described as the most effective way to visually encode all 
types of data, whether it is nominal, ordinal, or quantitative.  Research in the area 
has indicated that certain visual encodings are more effective than others, but 
that their efficacy is dependent upon the data they represent [8].  Examples of 
such visual encodings are color hue, shape, size, color brightness, and density.   
Business-type charts and graphs are a simple example of this type of 
visualization.  Profit and time do not contain any implicit spatial information, but 
we can apply an ordering to profit and time such that profit increases in a vertical 
direction, while time increases in the horizontal.  The spatial layout of our data 
points then provides an instant visual cue as to the trends within the data.  
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Figure 1.3.1:  Digital Research Suitability Guidelines [2] 
1.2.1.3. Security Visualization 
For analyzing log data, several approaches have been used in prior 
research.  Self-organizing maps were researched early on, and provided 
effective trend analysis and anomaly detection capabilities.  Force-based 
mapping techniques [9] have shown to be effective for anomaly and intrusion 
detection.  However, these systems do not relate the location information for IP 
addresses often critical to investigators.  Furthermore, they are designed for real-
time or playback visualizations, as opposed to investigative applications. 
Playback applications most closely mirror an investigative application, but 
generally lack broad overview capabilities.  This deficiency is in a critical area for 
the investigator, who needs to quickly understand the evidence that has been 
collected. 
1.3.  Digital Forensics and Digital Evidence 
 Digital Forensic Science came into its own as a field in 2001, at the First 
Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS).  At this workshop, researchers 
and practitioners met to discuss the major challenges, objectives, and ideas in 
the field.  They developed and published a set of objectives based on the area of 
operation.  
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1.3.1, the objectives of forensic application differ 
from industry to industry.  There are a number of challenges facing both 
researchers and practitioners as they work to complete their objectives.  
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Extending this work, Sarah Mocas [4] defined five primary properties that are 
desirable for forensic tools and processes.   
 Integrity 
Actions taken to secure and collect electronic evidence should not change 
that evidence.  
 Authentication 
Must be able to show in court this evidence is what its presenter claims.  
 Reproducibility 
This is a basic principle of the scientific process, which strengthens the belief 
that an experimental result is correct. 
 Non-interference 
Tools and processes must maintain integrity, or only result in identifiable 
interference.  Thus, the interference can be accounted for and disregarded. 
 Minimalization 
This principle is a requirement based on Federal law, and assures that the 
minimal amount of data needed was used. 
The practitioners of digital forensics have seen many changes throughout the 
last few decades.  As identified by [2], keeping up with technology is a major 
difficulty in the field.  In fact, a 1995 survey found that 70% of law enforcement 
agencies did not have a written procedures manual for digital evidence [5].  As 
time has progressed, these agencies have developed definitions and principles 
to govern their work with digital evidence.  Some important definitions from [5] 
include: 
 Digital Evidence: Information of probative value stored or transmitted in 
digital form. 
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 Data Objects: Objects or information of potential probative value that are 
associated with physical items.  Data objects may occur in different 
formats without altering the original information. 
 Original Digital Evidence: Physical items and the data objects associated 
with such items at the time of acquisition or seizure. 
 Duplicate Digital Evidence: An accurate digital reproduction of all data 
objects contained on an original physical item.  
1.3.1.  Investigative Context, Evidence of Offense, and 
Associative Information 
The context in which an investigation takes place is critical to determining 
what evidence can be used and how it can be used.  This investigative context 
contains three sets [4]: 
 A set of reasons for initiating the investigation. 
This set may include varied items, both technical and non-technical.  
Examples such as complaint reports, data loss, or intrusion alarms are all 
possible reasons for initiating an investigation. 
 A set of constraints on the scope of the investigation. 
These constraints may include both legal constraints and resource 
constraints.  These constraints are likely to affect the tools useful to an 
investigator. 
 A set of potential outcomes. 
The interesting subset of this is the set of outcomes desirable to the 
investigator.  This can be anything from prosecution to system restoration. 
The contents of the sets will likely vary as the industry of the practitioner 
changes, in accordance with the suitability chart in Figure 1.3.1.  In addition to 
the above components, the investigative context for a digital investigation also 
includes the technical environment – which can be either static, such as log files 
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collected from an imaged hard drive, or dynamic, such as logs still being actively 
modified.   
Finally, Mocas [4] established a distinction between evidence of offenses and 
associative information.  Evidence collected can directly support or establish the 
occurrence of a misdeed, which can be direct or circumstantial evidence of an 
offense.  Examples of digital evidence of offense would be a log showing 
unauthorized access or data exfiltration, the unauthorized transmission of data to 
an external entity.  It may also serve as associative information to connect or 
disconnect an actor or event from that evidence.  Examples of such would be 
subscriber IP address information during the time of offense. 
1.3.2.  Handling procedures 
“In order to ensure that digital evidence is collected, preserved, examined, 
or transferred in a manner safeguarding the accuracy and reliability of the 
evidence, law enforcement and forensic organizations must establish and 
maintain and effective quality system.  Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) are documented quality-control guidelines that must be supported by 
proper case records and use broadly accepted procedures, equipment, and 
materials.” [5] 
This statement serves as a guiding principle for evidence handling 
procedures.  The standards laid out in accordance with this principle provide 
a set of constraints for handling digital evidence.  The standards below are 
those relevant to technical procedures such as analysis and visualization: 
 Standards and Criteria 1.3 – Procedures used must be generally 
accepted in the field or supported by data gathered and recorded in a 
scientific manner. 
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Figure 1.4.1.  Digital Forensics Investigative Process 
 Standards and Criteria 1.5 – The agency must use hardware and 
software that is appropriate and effective for the seizure or examination 
procedure. 
 Standards and Criteria 1.6 – All activity relating to the seizure, 
storage, examination, or transfer of digital evidence must be recorded 
in writing and available for review and testimony. 
 Standards and Criteria 1.7 – Any action that has the potential to alter, 
damage, or destroy any aspect of original evidence must be performed 
by qualified persons in a forensically sound manner. [5] 
1.4. Forensic Process 
The First Digital Forensics Research Workshop outlined a linear 
investigative process for practitioners.  This process outlines the full set of tasks 
to be carried out by an investigator, without eliminating those that may not be 
considered “forensic.” 
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1.5. Network Forensics 
Network forensics is defined as “The use of scientifically proven 
techniques to collect, fuse, identify, examine, correlate, analyze, and document 
digital evidence from multiple, actively processing and transmitting digital sources 
for the purpose of uncovering facts related to the planned intent, or measured 
success of unauthorized activities meant to disrupt, corrupt, and or compromise 
system components as well as providing information to assist in response to or 
recovery from these activities.” [2] 
In addition to providing a definition of the field, researchers and practitioners 
at the conference identified the following major issues: 
 Time 
This is one of the most important issues in the application of network 
forensics.  Synchronization and integrity of dates and times associated with 
events, and is even more important when work spans multiple jurisdictional or 
time zones. 
 Complexity 
The level of detail is high for singular system analysis.  Most tools 
developed for this application do not translate well into networked analyses.  
Analysts and examiners also need tools to correlate and understand data 
relationships in the volumes of log data, particularly from intrusion detection 
systems. 
 Collection 
Collection is difficult given the traditional requirements on collectors.  
Freshness of data and what to collect are also concerns. 
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Figure 1.5.1.1.  Network Forensic Process 
 Paradigm Distinctions 
Law enforcement needs more data integrity, chain of custody, and proven 
& accepted methods in its tools.  Civilian and military applications are focused 
on intelligence and operations. 
 Collaboration 
Researchers identified a need for collaborative tools that are capable of 
simultaneous use or can spread data to associated parties quickly. 
 Legal Hurdles 
There are no established rules of engagement for effective and legal 
operation in many networked arenas.  Researchers were particularly 
concerned with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Security Systems 
Standards and Certification Act. 
 Emerging Technologies 
Focus groups identified the explosion in wireless technologies and 
integration as a major issue for network forensics, both for complexity and 
legal hurdles.  
1.5.1.  Network Forensic Process 
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Figure 1.5.1.1 depicts the process for performing network forensics 
analysis, as described in [3].  This process details the application of the overall 
digital forensics process described in Figure 1.4.1 to the network forensics field.  
Text-based analysis is a fundamental capability for performing network forensics, 
and is the traditional means of investigation.  Erbacher et al. [3] identified four 
major additional capabilities: pattern matching, stream identification, data 
browsing/examination, and domain knowledge.  It is understood that these 
capabilities must be available to, and integrated into, the visualization 
functionality. 
Visualization based analyses work with the investigator to improve the 
analysis process and results [3].  The primary goal is to improve comprehension 
of the events and analysis results.  These visualizations must be integrated with 
traditional forensic analyses in order to be effective.   
Finally, analysis results must be recorded so that they can be compared to 
prior or future analyses of the data.  This allows for reproducibility (see Section 
1.3) and aids in proving legal admissibility [3].  It can also be used to allow 
investigators to review previous findings without being forced to perform analysis 
again.   
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Figure 1.5.2.1.  Network Forensics Visualization Development 
Process [3] 
1.5.2.  Network Forensics Visualization Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5.2.1 outlines the development process for network forensics 
analysis tools, focused on forensic analysis visualizations.  This process is 
continual for the development of visualization and interactive techniques. 
Iteration in the upper section of the diagram allows for the incorporation and 
improvement of new text-based analysis methods.   
1.6. Computer Forensics 
The field of computer forensics is far more developed than that of network 
forensics.  FLI and the visualization extension are truly network forensic 
applications, and an overview of the computer forensics field is not necessary; 
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however, there is one specific consideration from the field that bears weight in 
our analysis and may be useful for understanding some of the design goals and 
decisions.     
1.6.1.  Role of computer 
When computers are involved in an incident, criminal or otherwise, they 
have three basic roles.  Below, each is discussed along with its relevance to the 
FLI Map visualization extension. 
o Target 
Many times, a computer itself is the target of an attack.  For 
example, attackers may be attempting to steal data directly off a 
machine.  In FLI, this is often referred to as the “anchor” computer 
(denoted by IP Address), or the “victim.”  This serves as a starting 
point for the forensic analyses. 
o Tool 
As mentioned in the motivation, advancing computer technology 
has not only provided rich targets for attackers but also new means for 
them to reach those targets.  Attackers wishing to target computer 
systems will often employ other computers as tools to carry out an 
attack, for everything from a simple scripted attack to complex, 
distributed, multi-stage attacks.  Endpoints of stepping stone and multi-
stage attack analyses fall into this category. 
o Latent Evidence Repository 
Finally, a computer may contain latent evidence of probative value 
to an investigation.  This may include, but is not limited to, log files, 
user files, operating system cache files, deleted files, or memory 
contents.  This application deals specifically with the log files 
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containing evidence from hops along an attack path.  Most of the 
computers displayed fall into this category. 
1.7. Intrusion Detection 
The field of intrusion detection is mentioned here, as many of the analysis 
methods utilized by FLI Map are rooted in intrusion detection research.  They 
were originally developed to function in the real-time, on-the-fly world of the 
intrusion detection system, or IDS.  Most recognize the potential for application 
after the fact, but focus design goals on real time analysis.  We will discuss 
related work in the field, along with associated visualizations if any exist.   
1.7.1. Stepping Stone Analysis 
Stepping stone analysis has become a very important part of the computer 
security field at large, as many attackers log in to long chains of computers to 
conceal their true location.  There are essentially three types of analysis 
methods: 
• Content Based 
These algorithms either modify or compare the content of the 
transmissions themselves.  These methods are completely ineffective against 
encrypted traffic, such as secure shell (SSH) connections. 
• Active 
Active methods, such as sleepy watermark tracing, modify the timing of 
individual packets to produce an overall “fingerprint” for the stream.  These 
systems would have to be in place prior to an event occurring.  It may also be 
argued that they violate the non-interference principle of digital forensic tools, 
as they modify a timing value and then use it to determine involvement. 
• Passive 
Passive methods are based solely on timing information, and do not 
require additional capabilities to be deployed prior to the event occurring.  
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Passive methods are suitable for forensic analysis, provided data can be 
obtained at the gateways of appropriate hosts. Zhang and Paxson [13] 
attempt detection based on the coincidence of ON/OFF periods. Yoda and 
Etoh [14] utilize statistical methods to compute timing deviations to detect 
attacking pairs of connections. Blum et al. [12] proposed a method based on 
computational learning theory.  Zhang et al. [11] proposed an algorithm based 
on correlating the data “ticks” between streams.    
There are few papers detailing approaches to visualizing stepping stone 
analysis results or evidence.  We were unable to locate any research with such 
visualization as its primary focus. 
1.7.2. Multistage Attack Analysis 
Mutli-stage attack analysis is a complicated area.  First, the ability to 
detect such attacks is based on observables, or specific actions that indicate 
attacker intention [15].  Some of this inference is based on attacker profiling.  
Marcus Rogers conducted an in-depth study of computer criminal behavior, 
which is informative for some types of attackers [17].  Building evidence graphs 
for this type of evidence has also been addressed [16]. 
1.7.3. Connection Analysis 
Much of the research in this area is focused on misuse detection.  The 
work related to the FLI visualization intersects with information visualization, and 
aims to make anomalies easily identifiable.  These anomalies can typically be 
investigated further to determine if it is misuse or not.  Examples include [3, 7, 9]. 
1.8. Attacker Modeling 
Another important, but often misunderstood, component of investigation is 
attacker modeling, sometimes called profiling.  The practice is most widely used 
in the development of mutli-stage attack analysis systems.  However, attacker 
modeling is also informative for developing integrated analysis visualizations, 
where output from one analysis method feeds into another.  It is important to 
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have a model of attack behavior, so that it can be analyzed as behaviors change 
and be adjusted accordingly. 
Another important component of modeling is that it often provides the only 
support investigators have to identify an attacker’s mission.  Missions can 
sometimes be inferred, but not supported [15].  Attacks generally move in 
phases, which vary based on the model.  These phases, or attack states, can be 
observed as states themselves or in the transitions between states.  An example 
would be a port-scanning alert – it may indicate that an attacker is conducting 
system discovery, or that they have begun or returned to the system discovery 
phase of the attack.  
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Figure 2.1.1.  FLI Overall Architecture [1] 
CHAPTER 2. DESIGN & ARCHITECTURE 
2.1. Overview 
This application is an extension of the FLI Map component of the Forensic 
Log Investigator, developed by Thieu Pham [1].  It is designed to provide 
network forensics examiners to perform complex analyses and quickly 
interpret the results.  This extension consists of two major components, an 
analysis framework and a display framework.  The application is integrated 
with the larger FLI software package, which utilizes client-server architecture.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The architecture of the FLI Map component also draws extensively on the 
Google Maps API.  In addition, it utilizes Java, Java Server Pages (JSP), 
JavaScript, an Oracle database for evidence, and a flat-file database for 
geocoding IP addresses.     
The overall process for FLI Map visualization involves three basic steps; 
receive an analysis request from the user, perform the analysis, and display 
the results.  The flowchart in Figure 2.1.2 below provides an overview of the 
process.  The upper half of the diagram represents the analysis framework, 
which begins with the analysis request and produces an analysis result.  The 
bottom half of the diagram shows the display framework process, receiving an 
analysis result and producing a map with the result drawn on it. 
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Figure 2.1.2.  FLI Map Overall Process for Analysis & Visualization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Analysis Framework 
The analysis framework provides the capability for the visualization 
extension to process analysis requests.  It is designed as a separate 
component so that it can be used by other FLI components in the future.  This 
component functions as the text-based analysis of the network forensics 
visualization (see Section 1.5).   
2.2.1.  FLI Analyzer 
The FLI Analyzer consists of four individual processes, each of which 
handles one type of analysis.  The final component is designed to include 
additional analyses as they are implemented. 
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2.2.1.1. Connection Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This analysis answers a very basic question, but one that is often 
relevant in forensic investigations – “who connected to whom?”  The 
algorithm accepts both a starting, or anchor, IP address and the 
number of analysis levels desired.  It recursively determines 
connecting IP addresses down a the desired number of levels.   
2.2.1.2. Stepping Stone Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1.1.1.  Connection Analysis Flowchart 
Figure 2.2.1.2.1.  Stepping Stone Analysis Flowchart 
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Figure 2.2.1.3.1.  Multi-Stage Attack Analysis Flowchart 
The stepping stone analysis is an implementation of the data tick 
analysis algorithm [11].  This analysis method was chosen for its 
robustness against both delay and chaff.  Other methods, such as 
ON/OFF, Deviation, IPD, State-Space, Multiscale, Detect-Attacks, and 
Detect-Attacks-Chaff (as named in [11]) were susceptible to different 
attack packet timing perturbations. 
2.2.1.3. Multi-Stage Attack Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Multi-stage attack analysis is based primarily on attacker modeling 
and intrusion detection system alerts. Since observables do not yet 
exist for attack phases such as logistics or detailed preparations, it 
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Figure 2.2.1.4.1. Full Analysis Flowchart 
focuses on a breakdown of system discovery and attack events, with a 
focus on components of these states relevant to an investigation.  It 
classifies results into categories based on the likely attack phase 
involved - reconnaissance, infiltration, attack, data exfiltration, or 
concealment.  For example, data exfiltration is really a part of the 
attack execution phase, but has particular interest to investigators 
because it has a significant impact on response.  For example, the 
response exfiltration of email records would likely be different than the 
response for exfiltration of a credit card database. 
2.2.1.4. Full Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This analysis is designed to combine the other methods in an 
elegant manner.  Streams connecting to the anchor are analyzed for 
stepping stone paths and multi-stage attack involvement.  Endpoints 
 22 
from the multi-stage analysis are further analyzed to determine if such 
an attack was carried out via a stepping stone chain.  Finally, end 
nodes are analyzed for connections.  This final step is crucial to 
identifying information gaps in the current evidence repository.   See 
Figure 2.3.2.4.1 below for an example. 
2.2.2. FLI Analysis Result 
In order for the results to be fully utilized, a common data format for 
results needed to be defined.  Additionally, the common format allows for 
maximum flexibility and will not require modification to include additional 
types of network forensic analysis, however, it is easily extensible.  The 
display framework is flexible in order to accommodate such extensions in 
the event that they become necessary. 
This “analysis result” data type is implemented to contain results in 
the form of FLIEventMapInfo and sub results.  A sub result is another 
AnalysisResult item, containing the results from a sub-component of the 
larger analysis request.  
An example of this is shown in Figure 2.3.2.2.1 below, specifically 
referencing a stepping stone analysis result. The first hops away from the 
anchor are results, while the remaining legs out from each of these are 
contained in their own sub result. 
2.3. Visualization Framework 
The visualization framework for FLI Map is responsible for displaying the 
results of each analysis method.  The process (see Figure 2.1.2) displays the 
provided analysis result on a map, utilizing the Google Maps API.  The related 
processes and visual encodings are described in these sections. This 
component functions as the visualization and interactive techniques portions 
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of the network forensics visualization (see Section 1.5).  It can also be used to 
produce legal presentation materials. 
2.3.1. Displaying Results 
The process of displaying a result must iterate through the set of 
results provided, and display them properly on a map.  There are 
essentially two primary pieces of information displayed.   
o Actors – individual IP addresses representing computers. 
o Associations – a link between actors. 
An analysis result contains actors as objects, with associations stored 
based on the structure of the result itself.  
2.3.1.1. Processing a Result 
When processing results, FLI Map is handling a single analysis 
result, which may contain additional results, also called sub-results.  
Individual results denote actors with an association to the analysis 
result’s “anchor.”  A sub-result, then, has an anchor that is also an 
individual result for its parent result.  Each result also contains type 
and subtype information, which further describes the associations 
between actors in the result.  Section 2.3.2 describes the visual 
encodings for these information vectors in detail. 
2.3.1.2. Map-Based Display 
FLI Map, as the name implies, is a cartographic visualization.  This 
provides visually identifiable location information crucial to 
investigators.   When displaying actors determined by results, identified 
by IP addresses, each must be placed to a physical location, using 
geocoding.  Additionally, cases where IP addresses are internal – and 
therefore not geocodable – must be handled. 
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2.3.1.2.1. Geocoding 
The geocoding of IP addresses is performed primarily by the 
analysis methods as they collect results.  This provides that each 
result with a valid public IP address has latitude and longitude 
information.  However, some results do not have valid addresses, 
and they are mapped to locations across the top of the map (in the 
Arctic Sea).   
2.3.1.2.2. Internal Address Mapping 
Some results have internal IP addresses.  In this case, a valid 
public IP address is obtained using the IP address of the logging 
device that captured it (collected along with the log itself).   
2.3.1.3. Additional Information 
The results provided by each algorithm contain additional 
information that is available by drill-down.  This information includes 
the IP address of the log that collected the information, the number of 
separate events that qualify, and detailed location information such as 
city, county, and area code.  This is done to assist investigators 
seeking to verify the jurisdictions involved in any investigation. 
Another important piece of information for investigators is the party 
who is registered for the IP address.  This information is obtainable by 
drill-down to the major WHOIS databases – ARIN, APNIC, and 
InterNIC.   
2.3.2.  Visual Encodings & Visual Metaphors 
The FLI Map visualization provides the following information, using 
the encodings denoted below each.  Following each encoding is a 
description of its use to display specific information vectors. 
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 Where are the actors physically located? (Physical Location of Actors) 
o Marker placement 
Encoding the physical location of each actor is based on geocoding 
the IP Address being mapped, using the Maxmind GeoIP API.  
Markers for internal addresses are mapped to the IP address of the log 
they were collected from.  In the event that an IP address is not 
geocodable, or both addresses are internal, the marker will be 
displayed at the top of the map.  This is done to prevent results from 
not displaying, and the investigator from having incomplete 
information. 
 Who is associated with whom? (Association of Actors) 
o Line endpoints 
The associations between the actors are encoded as lines from one 
to another.  Since the different analyses methods produce associations 
between multiple sets of actors, understanding the structure of the 
results relies primarily on this encoding.   
 How are they associated? (Analysis Method Producing Association) 
o Line color 
While the association of actors is important, it is only a portion of a 
more complete view of their association.  To an investigator, it is 
imperative to know whether the association is based on simple 
connection, if the association is part of a stepping stone chain, or if an 
attack has been identified.  Each necessitates different actions on the 
investigator’s part.  This encoding is based on the type and subtype of 
the analysis result, and provides investigators the ability to visually 
identify how actors are associated. 
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Figure 2.3.2.1.1.  Connection Analysis Example Screenshot 
 Who is the focus of this analysis? (Anchor Location) 
o Marker icon 
A final piece of important information is visual identification of the 
starting point for the analysis itself.  In FLI, this is referred to as the 
Anchor, or Victim, IP Address.   This special actor is displayed with a 
different marker image than other actors.  In addition, the map is 
centered upon this marker when the result is first displayed. 
2.3.2.1. Connection Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Connection analysis is a simple form of analysis designed to answer the 
question “Who connected to who?”  In FLI, the analysis will review subsequent 
hops, out to the specified level.  The example above shows only direct 
connections to the anchor IP address.   The visualization currently limits the 
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Figure 2.3.2.1.2. Comparison of Connection Analysis Results.   
A) Direct Connections (1 Level) B) Secondary Connections (2 Levels) C) Tertiary 
Connections (3 Levels) 
 
number of levels to analyze to three in order to keep overall processing time at 
an acceptable level.   The figure below illustrates the difference in results for 
each analysis type. Each hop out increases the number of nodes displayed, and 
each new level is displayed with lines representing each connection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
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Figure 2.3.2.2.1. Stepping Stone Analysis Example Screenshot 
2.3.2.2. Stepping Stone Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.2.2.1 shows the results of a stepping stone analysis performed 
on the same anchor above.  Connections not correlated are not displayed, and 
those that are displayed in red.  Also, stepping stone analysis is not limited to 
levels, and simply continues processing until no more streams correlate.  While 
the stepping stone algorithm used is capable of solving the indirect stepping 
stone analysis problem, the method for retrieving events limits it to the direct 
stepping stone analysis problem.  This decision to limit events considered was a 
performance trade off, as analyzing every possible connection stream 
dramatically increased processing time.  This analysis is only capable of 
identifying streams that include the anchor as a hop in the chain. 
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Figure 2.3.2.3.1.  Multi-stage Analysis Example Screenshot 
2.3.2.3. Multi-Stage Attack Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-stage attack analysis has a slightly more in-depth encoding than the 
other singular methods.  This is due to sub-typing of analysis results, based on 
event category.  The line colorings are kept to similar colors so that visual 
identification as a multi-stage analysis result is maintained, but differentiation 
between subtypes, or attack model phases, is possible.  The result above shows 
(from left to right) an attack, reconnaissance, and data exfiltration.   
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Figure 2.3.2.4.1.  Full Analysis Example Screenshot 
2.3.2.4. Full Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above illustrates the advantages of a combined visualization 
tool.  First, investigators can easily identify the stepping stone chain involving the 
anchor, as they would have been able to see in the standard stepping stone 
analysis only visualization.  However, we can also identify a second chain, 
unconnected to the first, which connects several of the nodes identified by the 
multi-stage analysis.  This gives the investigator a much richer understanding of 
what took place; for example, they may infer that these events were related, as 
opposed to separate alarms – even though the attacks were distributed 
geographically and temporally.  Furthermore, an investigator can quickly see that 
one endpoint of the stepping stone chain involving the anchor is outside the logs 
already collected, since we have no further connection data for that IP address.  
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 The identification of this information gap can lead the investigator to 
quickly determine where he or she needs to collect additional information.  Also, 
the visual encoding includes the information necessary to identify the jurisdiction.   
In the example above, the address in question is located in Oakland, CA.     
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CHAPTER 3. INFRASTRUCTURE 
3.1. Computer Languages 
This section describes the various languages utilized by the FLI Map 
visualization. 
3.1.1.  Java 
Java is a high-level object oriented programming language, 
developed by Sun Microsystems.  It provides a flexible backend to FLI, as 
it is compiled into machine-independent byte code.  
3.1.2.  Java Server Pages 
Java Server Pages is a Java-based technology that assists in the 
creation of dynamic web content through server-side production of HTML 
pages. 
3.1.3.  JavaScript 
JavaScript is a Java-like scripting language for client-side execution.  
It is responsible for pre-submission request handling, and managing the 
Google Maps API interaction within the client browser.  
3.1.4.  XML 
XML, or eXtensible Markup Language, is a highly structured yet 
general purpose markup language.  It is recommended by World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) as cross-platform, human readable, and portable.  
XML is widely used, and there are a number of applications and tools 
capable of working with and processing XML.  Its extensible nature 
supports multiple dialects, transforms, and styling specifications. 
3.1.5.  XPath 
XPath is essentially an XML query language, capable of addressing 
elements and values within an XML document.  It operates on the logical 
structure of the document, using path notation.  XPath also has 
functionality for comparing and manipulating those values.   
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3.1.6.  SQL 
SQL, or Structured Query Language, is designed for use with 
relational databases.  SQL provides data retrieval and management 
capabilities. 
3.1.7.  SQL/XML 
SQL/XML is the combination of the two technologies mentioned 
above for the specific purpose of dealing with XML data stored in 
relational databases.  It allows the integration of traditional relational 
database primitives with XML-type data.  It is retrieved and managed with 
a combination of SQL queries and XPath statements. 
3.2. Software Frameworks 
3.2.1.  Google Maps API 
The Google Maps API is heavily utilized by FLI Map for visualization 
of analysis results.  The API provides functionality to utilize pre-developed 
maps and controls, as well as extensions for defining your own 
components.    
3.2.2. Maxmind GeoIP API 
The Maxmind GeoIP API provides IP Address geocoding services.  In 
addition to providing latitude and longitude, it also provides further 
information to investigators such as country, city, and area code. 
3.2.3. Oracle DBMS 
Oracle Database is a DataBase Management System that supports 
SQL/XML.  It provides the evidence storage for FLI.  Oracle DMBS is both 
multi-threaded and multi-user capable.  
 
3.2.4.  Adobe Flex 2.0 
Adobe Flex is a set of technologies that provide advanced interactive 
capabilities for websites, based on the Flash platform.  Flex is a 
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presentation-layer technology, but other components, such as Flex Data 
Services, provide additional functionality. 
3.2.5.  Java Enterprise Edition Application Server 
Java’s Enterprise Edition Application Server provides management of 
web application communication between the server and clients.  JRun is 
the JEE application server utilized by FLI. 
3.2.6.  Hibernate API 
The Hibernate API is an object-relational mapping solution for Java.  
It is primarily utilized by the larger FLI package.  
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CHAPTER 4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter provides an overview of the work completed.  First, the FLI 
Map analysis and visualization extension is compared to its design goals, and 
reviewed for how well each goal was met.  Second, its place in the forensics 
process is discussed.  Third, its major components are summarized.  Finally, 
future work is outlined. 
4.1. Design Goal Achievement 
• Provide ability for investigators to visually correlate evidence and analysis 
across multiple logs 
This goal is accomplished with the combination of database-driven text-
based analysis and map-based visualization.  Each of the four visual 
metaphors correlates evidence across multiple log files, relying on the 
schema and import structure of FLI.  The flexibility of FLI’s SQL/XML backend 
handles widely varying queries.  
This ability is present, but does not assist as greatly when performing 
stepping stone analysis.  This is due to the time synchronization problem for 
logs collected from different locations.  However, if the logs are synchronized, 
it will be capable of correlating results. 
• Provide ability for investigators to visually correlate results from multiple types 
of analysis 
This design goal is handled entirely by the Full Analysis visual metaphor, 
as it is the only one to currently include multiple types of analyses.  However, 
this capability is particularly powerful when combined with the above ability to 
correlate results across multiple log files.   
This combination allows investigators to gain a level of comprehension 
and certainty of result that would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
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obtain by text-based analysis.  The use of a visual metaphor increases the 
amount of information that can be viewed at one time.  
• Assist in identifying information gaps 
The visual encodings for association between actors provide investigators 
the opportunity to visually identify where associations are not present.  
Domain knowledge, as discussed by [3], is a critical investigator skill that has 
not been replaced by analysis.  This knowledge leads investigators to know 
where associations should be present, but is not – an indication of missing 
information. 
• Properly handle evidence when performing analysis 
FLI Map and Analyzer provide reproducible results while maintaining the 
integrity of information in the database.  Furthermore, the analysis never 
writes any information back to the database, so it cannot interfere with the 
evidence contained within.  Finally, it logs analysis requests and results to a 
file for later review discovery. 
The FLI framework does not yet include full case or evidence 
management features.  As a result, maintaining minimalization during 
analysis is not fully accomplished.  The inclusion of current case information 
to the package will allow for this goal to be realized fully.   
4.2. Use in Investigative Process 
The FLI Map visualization and analysis framework apply to the 
examination, analysis, and presentation phases of the model described in [2].  
The may also assist in identification, if you consider the detection of 
information gaps part of the identification process. In the [3] model for network 
forensics, the work contained in this thesis applies to the text-based analysis, 
visualization-based analysis, analysis activities, analysis visualization, 
analysis validation, and legal presentation phases.  The body of work is 
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primarily in the visualization-based analysis, analysis activities, and analysis 
visualization; the other components are either rudimentary or were developed 
elsewhere.   
4.3. Component Review 
The extension for FLI described in this thesis is broken down into two 
components, one that provides the text-based analysis backend, and another 
that handles the visualization and interaction with results. 
4.3.1. Analysis Framework 
The majority of the analysis framework consists of components that 
leverage existing packages, algorithm implementations, and APIs.  Most 
of the work on this framework was integration, however, the full analysis 
method combining the varied types of text-based analysis was developed 
alongside the implementation of existing analysis algorithms. 
The Analyzer and AnalysisResult classes in the fli.util package were 
developed as part of this thesis.  Analyzer is a static class containing the 
procedures for analysis, while AnalysisResult was developed as a data 
structure for analysis output.  The new development that went into this 
framework consisted of integrating analysis implementations with the FLI 
framework and evidence repository database. 
4.3.2. Visualization Framework 
The Adobe Flex component, FLI Map, consists of a Java Server 
Pages frame. This architecture allows most of the processing to be 
handled at the server.  Keeping within the requirements for digital 
evidence, particularly integrity and non-interference, evidentiary data does 
not traverse the network prior to analysis, and is not subject to 
modification in transit.  
The development of this component comprises the work on analysis 
and interaction with data, and is primarily novel.  The logic for each visual 
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metaphor is present in this component.  This framework also handles user 
input, and provides default levels for analysis parameters.   
4.3.3. Categorization 
While this extended FLI Map is a visualization application, it is not easily 
categorized using prior research as a guide.  It utilizes geographic spatial 
information to map public IP addresses, but the spatial information is not truly 
inherent in the data – particularly if you consider the possibility of spoofed IP 
addresses.  Its use as a forensic application separates it in some respects 
from security visualization applications, although this seems to be the most 
appropriate category.     
4.4. Evaluation 
Evaluating these components must be based on their function.  The 
analysis component, which provides text-based analysis, should be evaluated 
for effectiveness and performance.  However, the methods utilized were 
already established, and their evaluation should be left to such research.  
However, the visualization component was primarily novel work, and 
evaluation is necessary. 
There are several approaches to evaluating visualization applications, and 
they are summarized in [10].  Recommended in this work is evaluation based 
on “how and why” a given visualization is effective.  This evaluation is based 
on the visual encodings used as well as the overall visual metaphor.  Findings 
from prior visualization research provide a basis for this evaluation.  The 
“How” part of the evaluation is primarily handled in the visual encodings and 
metaphors section above (2.3.2).  The “Why” is addressed here. 
The choice of markers to encode an address is effective because it 
associates the information with a visual symbol of the device represented – a 
computer.  The use of a map-based display is effective as it provides the user 
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an orientation they are already familiar with.  The use of a line was effective to 
represent association because it provides a visual connection to mirror the 
virtual.   Our choice of color to represent analysis type is effective because 
color has been found to be effective for encoding nominal data.   Additionally, 
the use of slightly varying colors to represent sub-types was effective 
because it allows distinction without disrupting the overall visual metaphor.  
Essentially, this allows quick visual correlation of related streams, with a 
cognitive distinction of sub-type following the pre-attentive grouping. 
4.5. Future Work 
The next phase of developing this visualization includes the addition of an 
information visualization for internal IP addresses, built into the larger map-
based visualization.  This visualization has the ability to use marker 
placement as an encoding, and some further research must to be done to 
determine the best choice of an information vector for this encoding.  Other 
effective encodings, such as line width, marker size, and line glyphs are still 
available for encoding additional information vectors, should additional 
analysis methods require them.  
Future work could include visualization for other types of network forensics 
text-based analysis, such as data mining.  Also, the multi-stage analysis 
method could be expanded to handle multiple attacker models, based on 
named actors or class [15].   Learning machines could be applied in an 
attempt to supplant investigator domain knowledge. 
Further work on FLI, particularly in case and evidence management, will 
enable more specific queries and analyses, which should improve the 
performance of the analysis framework.  In addition, they are required to 
prepare the analysis component for the law enforcement use, due to the 
minimalization requirement [4].     
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